Kim har ingen grund til at forhandle

Diverse — Drokles on August 14, 2017 at 8:07 am

“As Kim believes the ability to hit America with a nuclear weapon is the only certain way he has of deterring us from killing his regime and him, he will not be talked out of his ICBM.” skriver Pat Buchanan i Town Hall

Does anyone believe that, given his youth, his determination to drive us off the peninsula, and his belief that only an ICBM can deter us, this deal will last and he will abandon his nuclear program?

Given concessions, Kim might suspend missile and nuclear tests. But again, we deceive ourselves if we believe he will give up the idea of acquiring the one weapon that might ensure regime survival.

Hence, assuming this crisis is resolved, what does the future of U.S.-North Korean relations look like?

To answer that question, consider the past.

In 1968, North Korea hijacked the USS Pueblo on the high seas and interned its crew. LBJ did nothing. In April 1969, North Korea shot down an EC-121, 100 miles of its coast, killing the crew. Nixon did nothing.

Under Jimmy Carter, North Koreans axe-murdered U.S. soldiers at Panmunjom. We defiantly cut down a nearby tree.

Her er et, eller rettere 3 af 10 perspektiver, hvis man venter eller accepterer Nordkorea, som en atomvåbenmagt, som Ryan Mouro ridser op for Clarion Project

1.The Iranian and North Korean WMD programs should be seen as a single entity.

We must now assume that Iran likewise has the ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads onto ICBMs.

Iran and North Korea have shared virtually everything when it comes to ballistic missile and nuclear technology. One Iranian opposition group claimed that Iran continued its nuclear program in spite of the nuclear deal by simply outsourcing it to North Korea. The nuclear and missile tests are widely seen as being on done on behalf of Iran with Iranian scientists on the scene for their occurrences.

Both North Korea and Iran helped the Syrian regime pursue nuclear weapons, resulting in the Israeli airstrike on Bashar Assad’s nuclear reactor in 2007. Various reports indicate that Syria’s nuclear program continued thereafter, albeit on a smaller scale.

2.North Korea’s Links to Hamas, Hezbollah and reportedly Al-Qaeda-tied terrorists in the Philippines.

In 2003, the government of the Philippines said that it captured documents showing that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, an Islamist group that has had a relationship with Al-Qaeda in the past, paid $2 million to North Korea for guns, ammunition and grenades and was looking to buy mini-submarines. Another sale was reported in 2005 of 10,000 rifles.

In 2006, a federal judge ruled that North Korea is liable for damages caused to American-Israeli citizens due to its material support for Hezbollah. Iran sponsored North Korean assistance to help the terrorist group by providing rockets and missiles and guidance on building its sophisticated network of tunnels and bunkers. It said that Hezbollah terrorists have been traveling to North Korea for advanced training since the late 1980s.

In 2009, the UAE intercepted over 2,000 detonators for Hamas’ 122mm Grad rockets and associated equipment. Later that year, Israel intercepted 35 tons of rockets, RPGs, shoulder-fired missiles and equipment for surface-to-air missiles from North Korea to Iran for delivery to the Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist groups in Thailand.

In 2014, it was reported that Hamas was negotiating an arms deal with North Korea worth hundreds of thousands of dollars for missiles and communications equipment and a down payment had already been made. It is strongly suspected that North Korea helped Hamas build its sophisticated tunnel system that was used to attack Israeli civilians and wage war in 2014 against the Israeli military.

The Hamas terrorist group openly thanked North Korea for its political support against Israel this year. The North Korean regime (DPRK) pledged to “mercilessly punish” Israel for its leaders’ accurate description of the ruling leader as a “crazy.” The DPRK said it “fully supports” the Palestinian jihad to have an independent country and to seize Jerusalem, a vague statement that seems to imply material support.

We should expect such sales to increase as sanctions force the North Korean regime to look for more revenue, as well as ways to retaliate against the U.S. and its allies. The North Korean regime has no problem selling arms to Islamists and is not a target of the jihadists, so we shouldn’t be surprised if North Korea goes so far as to directly sell weapons and expertise to groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

3.North Korea has threatened to sell nuclear weapons to other countries and even international terrorist groups. It now has up to 60 nuclear weapons, a number that could grow to 100 by 2020.

In 2005, North Korea threatened to sell its nuclear weapons to terrorist groups “if driven into a corner.”

North Korea has a surplus of nuclear weapons. It can afford to sell off a few if it feels confident that U.S. intelligence will be unable to identify and intercept the shipment; a fair assumption given our recent underestimations of their capabilities.

Past customers for Iranian missiles and arms include Iran and its puppet Assad regime in Syria; Yemen, which is now working with Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood; Pakistan; Eritrea, which has supported Al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia; the Somali government; Cuba and possibly Venezuela. There are suspicions that Turkey is looking to build nuclear weapons, as an imam close to President Erdogan is encouraging this.

“As for the “military option,”", advarer Buchanen “U.S. strikes on Kim’s missile sites could cause him to unleash his artillery on Seoul” og “scores of thousands could be dead” indenfor den første uge. Og det vil tvinge USA til at benytte taktiske atomvåben, der måske igen vil udløse “the suicidal order to launch [Kim]s nukes”. Men dette scenario, at Norkorea med deres konventionelle artilleri, kan udslette Seoul, bygger på en række fejlslutninger, som streiff fra Redstate oplister. Her 3 af 8.

Fallacy #1. Seoul is within easy artillery range of North Korea.

This is simply not true. Thirty miles is extreme range for tube or rocket artillery. The entire North Korean Army has, at a high end estimate, a max of 500 artillery systems and 200 rocket systems that can range Seoul’s northern suburbs and Seoul from what is now North Korea. Only one-third of Seoul can be hit by any type of tube artillery. The drawing of a 44-mile circle and implying that there are hundreds of artillery pieces which can range as far as the heaviest North Korean rocket systems is just dishonest in the extreme.

Fallacy #2. All of these long range pieces are within range of Seoul.

Dispersion between artillery systems is going to be at least 50 meters. Math alone tells you once you start dispersing that you quickly run out of usable real estate. Why disperse? The blast radius for a 500-lb bomb (the B-2 carries 80 of these) is 50 meters. That means it will kill 50% of everyone within that zone. Even troops in bunkers will be killed or injured by the combination of overpressure and vacuum rupturing hollow organs. If you drop 1000-lb bombs, increasingly the weapon of choice, the 50% lethality radius exceeds 200 meters. If you want your artillery to survive more than the first air strike you will want them dispersed and in hardened positions. While the 44 mile radius on the map is cute, many of these weapons will be out of range of Seoul because clustering dozens of pieces up on the DMZ within easy range of ROK infantry and armor doesn’t make sense.

One intrepid soul used Google Earth to identify likely artillery positions by type, this is what he got:

north-korea-artillery2

Fallacy #3. North Korea will use all of its artillery to target Seoul.

This is probably the crux of the issue. Why would the North Koreans concentrate all of their artillery close to the border to bombard Seoul. If they level Seoul it doesn’t mean they win the war. And if the guns are aimed at Seoul they can’t aim at Allied troops. Likewise it will use its missiles to hit Osan and Pusan, the airfield and seaport, respectively, through which US forces will flow. If a war breaks out, North Korea will have to use its artillery in the conventional role of providing support to the infantry and armor units it sends south. You have to achieve a 3:1 power (troops, equipment, firepower) ratio to have a 50-50 chance of taking a defended position. You need at least a 5:1 ratio if you want to achieve a breakthrough attack. The only way the North Koreans can achieve that force ratio is to throw 100% of their artillery at the Allied units holding the line closest to the DMZ. They aren’t going to screw around shooting several months of ammunition production at Seoul.

(…)

The stories of an Armageddon in South Korea are simply not true. The ROK Air Force and ROK Army are not going to sit on their thumbs and allow Seoul to be pulverized. Neither will American forces. Just like we spent a lot of effort hunting SCUDs in both Gulf wars, the artillery that can shoot at Seoul will be quickly and ruthlessly hunted down and silenced.

Det afhænger af frygten for deres atomvåben. Jo større grund der er til at frygte dem, jo større grund er der til at handle. Risikoen afspejler det utålelige. Og hvis Kim slipper af sted med at beholde sine bomber, vil resten af Vestens diktator fjender se, at det er deres bedste livsforsikring.

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