Islamisk 30-års-krig eller 30 års islamisk krig?

Den arabisk muslimske verden ser ud til at bryde sammen i disse år. Ægyptens General El-Sissi er sikkert ganske sober når han påstår at han ved sit kup forhindrede Ægypten i at henfalde i en borgerkrig som den i Syrien-Irak. Men, hvis vi fokuserer på Syrien-Irak, hvad kan vi så alt andet lige se frem til? Richard Haas skrev i forrige måned i Project Syndicate at han kunne se en arabisk genopførsel af den europæiske Trediveårskrig

It is a region wracked by religious struggle between competing traditions of the faith. But the conflict is also between militants and moderates, fueled by neighboring rulers seeking to defend their interests and increase their influence. Conflicts take place within and between states; civil wars and proxy wars become impossible to distinguish. Governments often forfeit control to smaller groups – militias and the like – operating within and across borders. The loss of life is devastating, and millions are rendered homeless.

That could be a description of today’s Middle East. In fact, it describes Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century.

In the Middle East in 2011, change came after a humiliated Tunisian fruit vendor set himself alight in protest; in a matter of weeks, the region was aflame. In seventeenth-century Europe, a local religious uprising by Bohemian Protestants against the Catholic Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand II triggered that era’s conflagration.

Protestants and Catholics alike turned for support to their co-religionists within the territories that would one day become Germany. Many of the era’s major powers, including Spain, France, Sweden, and Austria, were drawn in. The result was the Thirty Years’ War, the most violent and destructive episode in European history until the two world wars of the twentieth century.

There are obvious differences between the events of 1618-1648 in Europe and those of 2011-2014 in the Middle East. But the similarities are many – and sobering. Three and a half years after the dawn of the “Arab Spring,” there is a real possibility that we are witnessing the early phase of a prolonged, costly, and deadly struggle; as bad as things are, they could well become worse.

Analogien til Trediveårskrigen rummer en falsk præmis om en lighed mellem kristendommen og islam. Trediveårskrigen afgjorde et konkret forhold mellem protestantismen og katolicismen, der erkendte at der eksisterede liv udenfor Kirken. Og den etablerede staterne og sikrede religionsfriheden i en orden, der alt i alt holdt til Napoleonskrigene, hvor en ny moderne virkelighed opstod med nye konflikter. Og selvfølgelig nye krige. Krigen mellem sunnier og shiaer er ikke ny og hadet mellem de to samt til alt andet er en indgroet del af religionernes essens og selvforståelse. Og mere klart bliver det ikke når Haas fortsætter

Islam never experienced something akin to the Reformation in Europe; the lines between the sacred and the secular are unclear and contested.

Moreover, national identities often compete with – and are increasingly overwhelmed by – those stemming from religion, sect, and tribe.

Den fremvoksende islamisme er reformationen, det er det muslimske råb ‘ad fontes’, det er bevidstgjorte muslimers opgør med ulemaens traditionelle fortolkningsret; sole scriptura. Islam kræver verdensherredømme og kan ikke finde hvile blot ved tanken om at der eksisterer dissidenter et sted i verden. Hvis denne krig varer tredive år vil den ikke slutte med en westfalsk fred, men blot med udmattelse indtil næste omgang. Det er også David P Goldmans anke mod Haas, som han skriver i Middle East Forum. For Goldman er krigen i Mellemøsten et demografisk fænomen mere end et strategisk og eksemplerne er trediveårskrigeNE

Wars of this sort end when two generations of fighters are killed. They last for decades (as did the Peloponnesian War, the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars of the 20th century) because one kills off the fathers in the first half of the war, and the sons in the second.

This new Thirty Years War has its origins in a demographic peak and an economic trough. There are nearly 30 million young men aged 15 to 24 in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran, a bulge generation produced by pre-modern fertility rates that prevailed a generation ago. But the region’s economies cannot support them. Syria does not have enough water to support an agricultural population, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of farmers into tent cities preceded its civil war. The West mistook the death spasms of a civilization for an “Arab Spring,” and its blunders channeled the youth bulge into a regional war.

The way to win such a war is by attrition, that is, by feeding into the meat-grinder a quarter to a third of the enemy’s available manpower. Once a sufficient number of those who wish to fight to the death have had the opportunity to do so, the war stops because there are insufficient recruits to fill the ranks. That is how Generals Grant and Sherman fought the American Civil War, and that is the indicated strategy in the Middle East today.

It is a horrible business.

(…)

Three million men will have to die before the butchery comes to an end. That is roughly the number of men who have nothing to go back to, and will fight to the death rather than surrender.

Goldman fortsætter med kontrafaktiske analyser man kan nørde lidt med, hvis man er til den slags. Læsværdig er den i hvert fald.

1 Kommentar »

  1. [...] gang. De 30 års krig i den muslimske verden vi måske kan se frem til, som Khader refererer har vi nævnt tidligere ved at citere Richard Haas og David P [...]

    Pingback by Monokultur » Nissen flytter med — May 26, 2015 @ 2:11 am

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