Den almenmuslimske klangbund

Daily Mail har en usædvanligt klar artikel om osmannernes folkemord på armenierne i 1915. Tyrkiets vrangvilje mod at erkende fortidens synder bliver forklaret med en national identitet, der ikke kan bære at det moderne Tyrkiet blev grundlagt på folkemord og etnisk udrensning (også grækere blev udryddet). Og sandt er det, at det ved lov er forbudt at fornærme tyrkiskhed. Men Tyrkiet er ikke Osmannerriget og kan ret beset ikke stå på mål for den historie. Skammen handler om islam. Osmannerriget var det nærmeste muslimerne kom et kalifat. Og Osmannerrigets forbrydelser er kalifatets forbrydelser.

Unleashed on the Armenians, Turkish policemen and soldiers ransacked Christian churches and handed bishops and priests over to the mob.

Community leaders such as doctors and teachers were hanged in batches on gallows in town squares. An American missionary reported seeing men tied together with their heads sticking through the rungs of a ladder to be lopped off with swords.

Torture was commonplace, Morgenthau maintained as he studied the evidence. ‘They would pull out eyebrows and beards almost hair by hair, extract fingernails and toenails, apply red-hot irons and tear off flesh with pincers, then pour boiled butter into the wounds.’

Crucifixion was treated as a sport. ‘As the sufferer writhes in his agony, they would cry: “Now let your Christ come and help you”.’

When orders were given to assemble all the Armenians and march them out into the desert, Morgenthau had no doubt that this was ‘the death warrant to a whole race’. Moreover, he said: ‘In their conversations with me, the authorities made no particular attempt to conceal the fact’.

He wrote graphically of how men were taken from their ploughs, women from their ovens and children from their beds to join ‘the panic-stricken throng’. Young men were strung up or shot — ‘the only offence being that they were Armenians’.

Convicts were let out of prison to help with the killings. Locals joined in, too. In Ankara, all Armenian men aged 15 to 70 were bound in fours and led out to a secluded valley, where Turkish peasants hacked them to death with scythes, spades and saws.

‘In this way, they exterminated the whole male population.’

For six months, as the enforced exodus went on, Morgenthau reported, roads and tracks were crowded with lines of Armenians.

‘They could be seen winding through every valley and mountain-side, moving on they scarcely knew where, except that every road led to death.

‘They left behind the unburied dead, as well as men and women dying of typhus, dysentery and cholera and children setting up their last piteous wails for food and water.’

How many died? Morgenthau reported that, on one particular death march, of the 18,000 who set out, just 150 were alive a week later.

A survivor recalled that ‘death was our constant companion. We fought the threat of panic, hunger, fear and sleepless nights but, in the end, they won. It seemed there was no pity or humanity in the hearts of our captors’. As they crossed the Euphrates river, one witness reported how ‘bloated bodies lay on the bank, black from the sun, tongues hanging out. Bones showed through decaying skin’.

‘The stomachs of pregnant women had been slit open and their unborn children placed in their hands like black grapes. Children were crying next to dead parents. Women were delirious.’

So many dead bodies clogged the river that its course was diverted for several hundred yards. But at least the water gave relief to some. Mothers sank into it gratefully, their babies in their arms, to drown and end their misery.

Women suffered special horrors. Aghavni — that girl whose story of stumbling on her father’s crucified and decapitated body we saw earlier — recalled how, in her home town, a group of 20 Armenian women were forced to dance under a blue, cloudless sky.

‘Turkish soldiers stood behind them shouting “Dance, sluts” and cracking their whips across their breasts, so their clothes would fall off. Some were half-naked, others tried to hold their clothes together.

‘The women were praying as they moved in a slow circle, holding hands. Occasionally, they would drop the hand next to them and quickly make the sign of the cross.

‘When they fell down, they were whipped until they got up and continued their dance. Each crack of the whip and more of their clothing came off.

‘Around them stood their children, who were forced to clap, faster and faster. If they stopped, they were whipped.

‘Some were two years old and barely able to stand up. They cried uncontrollably, in a terrible, pitiful, hopeless way.’ All of this was watched by a crowd of delighted Turkish townspeople in smart dresses and business suits, ‘clapping, too, like cockroaches’.

What came next was beyond belief. ‘Two soldiers pushed through the crowd, swinging buckets, and doused the women with kerosene. As the women screamed, another soldier came forward with a torch and lit each woman by her hair.

‘At first, all I could see was smoke. Then I saw the fire coming off their bodies, and their screaming became unbearable.

‘The children were being whipped furiously now, as if the burning mothers had excited the soldiers, and they admonished the children to clap faster and faster, telling them that if they stopped they, too, would be set on fire.

‘As the women collapsed in burning heaps, oozing and black, the smell of burnt flesh made me sick and I fainted.’

On the death march out into the desert, Aghavni remembered how women were openly tortured and abused. ‘If a woman would not readily submit to sex, she was whipped and, if she tried to run away, she was shot.’

She could only watch in horror as a girl resisted and a policeman took out his sword, ripped open her dress and then slashed off her breasts. ‘They fell to the ground and she bled to death next to them.’ Aghavni survived her ordeal — one of the few to do so. She lived, eventually making her way to America to give her first-hand account of a genocide that the Turkish authorities are still adamant did not take place.


Det samme had ser man i dag i den muslimske verden. Man har altid set muslimske massakrer på deres omgivelser. Med jævne mellemrum bryder nye massakrer ud. Dengang som idag til de fleste muslimers store jubel. Nogle har ikonisk status, som the Ramallah Lynching, den palæstinensiske hobs slagtning af to israelske reservister. “The Israeli reservists were beaten, stabbed, had their eyes gouged out, and were disemboweled“. Al-Shabaab massakrerede alle der ikke kunne citere koranen på en skole i Kenya. Islamisk Stat libyske afdeling har just massakreret 30 etiopiske kristne. “Be til Allah eller dø!” råbte muslimerne førend de smed de kristne flygtninge overbord til druknedøden. Osv, osv. Muslimernes had til os andre, til alle faktisk er overvældende. Venstres Inger Inger Støjbergs møde med 4 arabere på en tankstation er mere end blot en ubehagelig oplevelse. Det er et varsel. Som Peter Hitchens skrev i Daily Mail; ”A wave of human misery is now heading to Europe” .

Det græske folkemord og venstrefløjens ufrivillige islamkonfrontationer

Den svenske udenrigsminister kom til at fornærme muslimerne, da hun kritiserede Saudiarabiens barbariske skikke. Som et forsøg på at forklare sig sondrede hun bizart mellem sharia og islam. Sverige undskyldte til sidst deres forsvar for banale menneskerettigheder.

Venstrefløjens forståelse af frigjorthed og almenmenneskelige værdier strider imod islam. Det vil de ikke indrømme og har flittigt brugt islam og muslimer som rambuk i deres forbitrede hævntogt på kristne og konservative nationale dyder og vædier, der er stedfortræder for de forældre der gav dem ikke blot alt, men måske mere end de kunne bære. Og så langt de er lykkedes med deres ødelæggelse af deres ophav så langt sidder de nu mere og mere alene tilbage med islam og muslimerne. Efterhånden har de ikke den gamle nation som mellemlæg at skyde på, men står nu selv overfor islam og muslimerne. Nu mærker de efterhånden omend ufrivilligt de kulturelle brudzoner.

I “Foråret 2013 kørte Center for Voldtægtsofre” kampagnen “At klæde sig sexet er ikke kriminelt“. Nu vil Københavns Kommune også markere sig ifølge Jyllands-Posten

Sæsonen for sol og masser af bar hud er åbnet, og det falder sammen med Københavns Kommunes anti-voldtægtskampagne.

Som blikfang i bybilledet på busser og plakater er netop en nedringet pige, der ledsages af teksten: »At klæde sig sexet er ikke kriminelt – voldtægt er!«

»Det er desværre en nødvendig kampagne, for der er stadig behov for at fastslå, at man har ret til at sige nej til sex uanset hvad. Selv om man optræder i en nedringet bluse eller kommer til at drikke sig lidt for fuld, er det ikke ensbetydende med, at man på forhånd har sagt ja til sex,« siger sundhedsborgmester Ninna Thomsen (SF) om baggrunden for kampagnen.

Skønt det er kampagner, der kun skal stive de kampagnerendes skinhellige selvforståelse af, er det en kampagne, der retter sig direkte imod islam (og vel også mod Uffe Ellemanns tilsvarende  bebrejd-offeret logik). For et par år siden kunne man som nogen nok husker høre hvorledes muslimske piger i Vollsmose følte sig sikret imod chikane, fordi de “bar uniformen“. Ingen kan være i tvivl om, hvad tørklædet og den videre formummelse betyder selv om venstrefløjen benægter hårdnakket, også for sig sig selv.

Tyrkiets præsident Recep Tayyib Erdogan har udover at advare Paven mod at tale for meget om det armenske folkemord, raset imod Københavns beslutning om til maj i nogle dage at opstille denne skulptur til minde om osmannernes folkemord (i medierne omtalt folkedrab) på armenierne


“Ingen husker armenierne” skal Hitler have sagt, som et carte Blanche for at løse ‘jødeproblemet’ med industrielt massemord. Det gør flere og flere folk dog idag, selv om man stadig er i tvivl på TV2. Men ikke mange husker dog at også grækere var ofre for de osmanniske muslimers folkemord. Direkte løftet fra Neos Kosmos

Pontian and Anatolian Greeks were victims of a broader Turkish genocidal project aimed at all Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. A total of more than 3.5 million Greeks, Armenians, and Assyrians were killed under the successive regimes of the Young Turks and of Mustafa Kemal from roughly 1914 to 1923. Of this, as many as 1.5 million Greeks may have died. The end of the genocide marked a profound rupture in the long Greek historical presence on the Asia Minor.

Greek communities began inhabiting Anatolia (Greek for “east”), otherwise referred to as the Asia Minor, since the 12th century BCE. They centered mostly along the Aegean littoral, although some Greeks, known as Pontians, went further east and colonized the southern shores of the Black Sea. Turkic peoples migrated into Anatolia over the first millennium CE and by the 14th century had established the Ottoman Empire. Over the next six hundred years, the Empire organized its ethnically diverse population into the millet system, thereby ensuring cultural and religious pluralism.

Under this system, the Ottoman Greeks, like other Christian communities in the Empire, were provided with a degree of autonomy. The geographic extent and political power of the Ottoman Empire began to decline over the 19th century as subjected peoples, especially the Greeks, began exerting their own nationalist aspirations. With the support of the Great Powers, the Greeks successfully overthrew Ottoman rule during their War of Independence from 1821 to 1830, thereby establishing the modern Greek state as it is currently situated at the tip of the Balkan Peninsula. However, the over two and a half million ethnic Greeks still living in Anatolia, separated from their Balkan compatriots, suffered the scorn of an increasingly vitriolic Turkish nationalism tainted by a bitter sense of humiliation.

The Young Turk movement emerged from this context, eventually aiming to turn the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire into a homogenous Turkish nation state. Under the banner of the Committee for the Union of Progress (CUP), this ethnic nationalist movement assumed power after a coup d’etat in 1913.

This political revolution occurred in the midst of the Balkan Wars from October 1912 to July 1913, which ultimately ended five centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. Afterwards, there was a brief diplomatic effort between the Greeks and the CUP to arrange a population exchange.

However, the outbreak of World War I stunted this effort, and instead the CUP took its own radical initiatives. They began singling out all able-bodied Greek men, forcibly conscripting them into labor battalions which performed slave labor for the Turkish war effort. Greek children were stolen and forcibly assimilated into Turkish society. Greek villages were brutally plundered and terrorized under the pretext of internal security. Indeed, as with the Armenians, the Greeks were generally accused as a disloyal and traitorous “fifth-column,” and eventually most of the population was rounded up and forcibly deported to the interior.

This modus operandi was more or less the same for all three Christian victim groups. Again with support of the Great Powers, Greece invaded part of Anatolia immediately after the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I. Centered around the Aegean port city of Smyrna (now known by its Turkish name, Izmir), Greek occupation forces brutally subjected local Turks, thereby further stoking interethnic conflagrations.

At the same time, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was leading a Turkish resurgence, eventually dispelling the Greek military from Anatolia. Turkish forces retook Smyrna in September 1922, instigating a massive anti-Greek pogrom. On September 13, a fire broke out amidst the chaos, spreading uncontrollably over the next two weeks. The Smyrna catastrophe took the lives of somewhere between 10,000 to 15,000 Greeks.

Two months later, diplomatic negotiations between the Kemalist regime and the Great Powers began in Switzerland, leading to the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in February 1923. The sovereign status of a Turkish nation state was thereby affirmed, and the Great Powers essentially condoned the Turkish genocidal project.

The demographic consequences of the Greek genocide are not objectively certain. The prewar population of Greeks was at least 2.5 million. Over the course of 1914 to 1923, about one million had migrated, some voluntarily but most under coercion. As many as 1.5 million Greeks died, either from massacre or exposure, although this figure is not positive. Presently, a miniscule Greek population remains in Turkey. Greek communities annually commemorate the genocide on September 14 in recognition of the Smyrna catastrophe.

Source: Centre for the study of Genocide, Conflict Resolution, and Human Rights, Rutgers University

Osmannernes folkemord på armenierne og grækerne var muslimers folkemord kristne.

Krigen mod Boko Haram

Jihad, Kalifatet, Kristenforfølgelse, Muslimer, Sharia, Terror, islam, muhammed — Drokles on April 13, 2015 at 7:54 pm

Islam er i færd med endnu en reformation. Dem har der været mange af før og der vil, hvis islam ellers overlever, komme flere endnu. Islams absurditeter er ubærlige at leve med og umulige at bygge samfund på. Derfor vil muslimske samfund altid degenerere væk fra islam over i en mere tålelig tilstand af tyranni, korruption og uproduktivitet. Men med jævne mellemrum bliver den kognitive dissonans for stærk for de troende, der bebrejder de sørgelige samfundforhold manglen på tro og renhed. Og en vækkelse går sin blodig gang gennem de muslimske samfund og - hvis muligt - deres ulykkelige omgivelser. Al-Quada, Islamisk Stat, Salafisme, Muslimske Broderskab, Boko Haram. Forskellige navne for det samme fænomen; muslimer prøver at redde deres dødsyge religion gennem endnu en renselse, endnu en tilbagevenden til rødderne. Ali Sina skriver

Many westerners erroneously believe that Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, (1703–1792) was the founder of Salafism, an extremist sect of Islam. This is not true. Abdul Wahhab did not found a new sect. He was a reformer of Islam in the same sense that Luther was of Christianity.

The core of Abdul Wahhab’s thinking is that Islam is perfect and complete and its decline is the result of religious innovations (bid‘ah), and that an Islamic revival will result by purging the religion from foreign influences and by emulating Muhammad and his companions.

The concept that Islam was perfect in its early stages is asserted in the Quran. “Today have I perfected your religious law for you, and have bestowed upon you the full measure of My blessings, and willed that self-surrender unto Me shall be your religion.” (Q.5:3)

Abdul Wahhab proposed that Muslims should refrain from introducing any innovation and follow the examples of the salaf, (predecessors or early generations) hence the name Salafi.

This definition is not an invention of Abdul Wahhab, but is based on a hadith that reports Muhammad saying, “The people of my generation are the best, then those who follow them, and then those who follow the latter (i.e. the first three generations of Muslims).[2]

It is important to note that ibn Taymiyyah (1263 – 1328) was also a Salafi. He opposed the celebration of Muhammad’s birthday and the construction of shrines around the tombs of Sufi ‘saints,’ saying, “Many of them [Muslims] do not even know of the Christian [Catholic] origins of these practices. Accursed be Christianity and its adherents.”

There is a hadith where Muhammad says, “I am the best Salaf for you.” [3]

The desire to reform Islam and go back to its original pristine state is actually an old thought. Abdul Wahhab, however, succeeded to give shape to this concept, which took ground thanks to the Saudi kings who are his descendants through one of his daughters.

Vice News er taget til fronten i kampen mod Boko Haram

En drive by Braad

Drive by debunkning. Jeg ville egentlig bygge en lille artikel op omkring følgende udtalelse fra Braad Thomsen

“Projektiv identifikation betyder, at man flytter sine mest uheldige egenskaber over på andre. Fordelen er, at man bliver fri for et besværligt selvopgør og i stedet skaber en syndebuk, som man forsyner med de egenskaber, man ikke kan tåle hos sig selv.

Og så blot citere, hvad han kalder alle sine fjender - og han har mange. For Braad Thomsen er en mand uden ironi, hvilket hans kunst også bærer præg af. Han ser ikke hulheden i psykologiserende argumenter, som rammer det alment menneskelige at man ikke ser bjælken i sit eget øje. så Braad Thomsen mener at det er hans fjender, der er ofre for projeksiv identifikation, mens han udnævner denne og hin DF’er og af ham selv DF associeret til at være ikke stueren.

Men Thomsens mange absurditeter kaldte på en god gammeldags debunksningspost, som anale blogs som Monokultur altid fristes af.

Men Nyrup har jo ret, hvilket DF’s udenrigsordfører, Søren Espersen, kom for skade at illustrere meget bogstaveligt, da han om Israels seneste massakre i Gaza skrev:

»Israel slår en prut, og verden skriger og boykotter.«

Det er en stinkbombe af dimensioner at kalde massakren på 2.000 palæstinensere for en prut. DF lugter fortsat fælt.

Det er en simpel løgn at kalde Israels fantastiske og elegante operation imod Hamas for en massakre. Faktisk var den med John Kerrys ord “et fantastisk stykke præcisionsarbejde

Pia Kjærsgaard mener ikke, at danske frihedsværdier bør gælde for muslimer. De må ikke gå klædt, som de har lyst; de bør ikke tale deres modersmål offentligt, og de bør ikke have mulighed for et frit tv-valg, hvis det omfatter Al-Jazeera.

Muslimer er altså ikke danskere, også ifølge Braad Thomsen. Rart at få det på plads.

Muslimer, kristne og jøder har ofte levet udmærket sammen.

Muslimer har aldrig levet udmærket sammen med nogen. End ikke med sig selv jævnfør de muslimske masser der flygter fra deres muslimske hjemland grunden mængden af muslimer, der vil dem til livs. Raymond Ibrahim dokumenterer muslimers forfølgelse af kristne og skriver at det er en 1.400 år gammel tradition9 af de 10 værste lande for kristenforfølgelse er muslimske. Jøderne blev stort set udrenset fra mange arabiske lande efter Israels oprettelse, 800.000 eller cirka deromkring, får aldrig ret til hjemvendelse. Det arabisk-muslimske had til Israel fra dets fødsel og før vidner om sameksistenslyrikkens løgn.


Jesper Langballe beskriver i sin pjece Som mand og kvinde, hvordan homoseksualitet »accelererer epidemisk«, og håner de homoseksuelle for at rende myndigheder på dørene »for at blive erklæret for normale«. For normale bliver de aldrig.

Normalitet afgøres af flertallet og homosexuelle er hvad angår sexualitet i mindretal og derfor er de ikke normal. Og det er, hvad Langballe henviser til.

’Æresdrab’ er et begreb, man normalt klistrer på muslimer, skønt de fleste muslimer tager afstand fra denne bestialske skik. Men æresdrab findes jo også i Danmark under betegnelsen ’jalousidrab’.

Nej Braad Thomsen, det er direkte forkert. Æresdrab er kultur og/eller religions betinget. Det betyder at man begår et overlagt mord for at få genskabt sin eller familiens ære. Æresdrab er en norm i samfundet, hvor det netop er i forventning om at opnå omgivelsernes respekt at man myrder sin egen æt. Et jalousidrab derimod begås i affekt og i Danmark er det ugleset indtil det strafbare.

»På grund af sit jødiske blod var han [Harald Nielsen] uden pietet for, og samhørighed med, landets fortid.« Dermed gør Krarup sig til talsmand for en Blut und Boden-filosofi, som er en nazistisk og islamistisk specialitet – og har siden erstattet sin antisemitisme med islamofobi.

Det væsentlige er ikke at Braad Thomsen aldrig vil kunne føre et meningsfuldt argument for, hvad der adskiller islamisme fra islam, der begger bygger på de samme tolkninger af de samme tekster. Hvad der er væsentligt er at blut und boden intet har med islam at gøre og er et halvt århundrede før nazismen. Nazisterne var ikke blot glad for romantikernes og racialisternes blodets bånd til jorden, de var meget, meget glade for jorden i sin egen ret. Alligevel kalder Braad Thomsen ikke Liste Ø for nazister for at have overtaget det nazistiske syn på økologi.

Noget af det mest modbydelige, der er kommet ud af Pia Kjærs-gaards mund, er, at hun sammenligner Johanne Schmidt-Nielsen med massemorderen Pol Pot:

»Det nærmeste, man kommer Enhedslistens idealsamfund, er muligvis Cambodja/Kampuchea under massemorderen Pol Pot, hvis røde khmerer naturligvis også havde deres tilhængere på den danske venstrefløj, og som på kun fire år myrdede og torterede cirka 1,7 millioner mennesker i perioden 1975-1979.« (DF’s ugentlige nyhedsbrev 16. juni 2012)

Så efter endnu engang at have kaldt Krarup for nazist vånder Braad Thomsen sig over Pia Kjærsgaards oratoriske etikette. Og hvor har hun ret, den gode Pia Kjærsgaard. Men det ser Braad Thomsen ikke, som han hælder sit skidt ud over alle andre i sin evindelige tilstand af ‘projektiv identifikation’.

Venstrefløjen hader dem, der hader ondskab

Den amerikanske præsident Barak Hussein Obama bruger ofte udtrykket “en bankerot ideologi” om ISIS, Kalifatet i Irak og Levanten. Det er helt sikkert en ond ideologi og den hedder islam, men den er ikke bankerot. Den er sine steder, som hos ISIS ganske levende og dyrkes med stor nidkærhed og med et formål.

Hvad der derimod er bankerot ideologi er venstrefløjens dogmatiske kompleks af værdier. Så bankerot at Obama og mange andre med ham, end ikke kan sætte ord på det der skræmmer dem af frygt for at indrømme, deres eminente fejl og svigt. Dennis Prager diagnosticerer i Townhall venstrefløjens fortrængning af ondskabens realitet med udgangspunkt i netop Obama

There is no question about whether President Obama — along with Secretary of State John Kerry and the editorial pages of many newspapers — has a particular dislike of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

But there is another question: Why?

And the answer is due to an important rule of life that too few people are aware of:

Those who do not confront evil resent those who do.

Take the case at hand. The prime minister of Israel is at the forefront of the greatest battle against evil in our time — the battle against violent Muslims. No country other than Israel is threatened with extinction, and it is Iran and the many Islamic terror organizations that pose that threat.

It only makes sense, then, that no other country feels the need to warn the world about Iran and Islamic terror as much as Israel. That’s why when Benjamin Netanyahu speaks to the United Nations about the threat Iran poses to his country’s survival and about the metastasizing cancer of Islamist violence, he, unfortunately, stands alone.

Virtually everyone listening knows he is telling the truth. And most dislike him for it.

Appeasers hate those who confront evil.

Haviv Rettig Gur giver i Times of Israel et fremragende portræt af Obama og hans foragt for Israels premierminister Benjamin Netanyahu

At a recent gathering of the Israel Council on Foreign Relations, the eminent former director general of the Foreign Ministry, Prof. Shlomo Avineri, called Obama’s foreign policy “provincial.” It was a strange choice of words to describe the policies of a president with such a cosmopolitan outlook and so much eagerness to engage the world.

But Avineri had a point.

Obama’s remarkable memoir, “Dreams from My Father,” includes a powerful account of how his experiences as a young, keenly observant social organizer in South Chicago instilled in him the sensibility that would come to define his presidency.

In the book, he describes his reaction upon hearing the children of a poor Chicago neighborhood divided into “good kids and bad kids – the distinction didn’t compute in my head.” If a particular child “ended up in a gang or in jail, would that prove his essence somehow, a wayward gene…or just the consequences of a malnourished world?”

“In every society, young men are going to have violent tendencies,” an educator in one majority-black Chicago high school told him in the late 1980s. “Either those tendencies are directed and disciplined in creative pursuits or those tendencies destroy the young men, or the society, or both.”

The book is full of such ruminations, and they echo throughout Obama’s rhetoric as president. In his last speech to the UN General Assembly, he asserted that “if young people live in places where the only option is between the dictates of a state or the lure of an extremist underground, no counterterrorism strategy can succeed.”

For Obama, terrorism is, at root, a product of social disintegration. War may be necessary to contain the spread of Islamic State, for example, but only social reform can really cure it.

Add to this social vision the experience of a consummate outsider – half-white and half-black, with a childhood and a family scattered around the world – and one begins to see the profile of a man with an automatic empathy for the marginalized and an almost instinctive sense that the most significant problems of the world are rooted not in ideology but in oppressive social and economic structures that reinforce marginalization. This sensibility is broader than any economic orthodoxy, and is rooted in the hard experience of South Chicago.

After taking the helm of the world’s preeminent superpower in January 2009, this social organizer set about constructing a foreign policy that translated this consciousness into geopolitical action.

“The imperative that he and his advisors felt was not only to introduce a post-Bush narrative but also a post-post-9/11 understanding of what needed to be done in the world,” James Traub noted in a recent Foreign Policy essay. “They believed that the great issues confronting the United States were not traditional state-to-state questions, but new ones that sought to advance global goods and required global cooperation — climate change, energy supply, weak and failing states, nuclear nonproliferation. It was precisely on such issues that one needed to enlist the support of citizens as well as leaders.”

The world was one large Chicago, its essential problems not categorically different from those of South Chicago’s blacks, and the solutions to those problems were rooted in the same essential human capacity for overcoming social divisions and inequities. This was Obama’s “provincialism” — his vision of the world that favored the disadvantaged and downtrodden, that saw the ideological and political clashes between governments as secondary to the more universal and ultimately social crises that troubled a tumultuous world.

Republikanerne erkender ondskaben og forærede Netanyahu en bronzebuste af Churchill.

Alle skal krydse deres egne spor

Information supplerer den løbende ytringsfrihedsdebat med lidt skrivende kolorit fra fire kvindelige forfattere og Thomas Boberg

Efter lørdagens angreb på Krudttønden og Københavns Synagoge sidder følelserne uden på tøjet, og retorikken skærpes. Vi har bedt fem forfattere – Carsten Jensen, Merete Pryds Helle, Kirsten Thorup, Kristina Stoltz og Thomas Boberg – om fri af døgnet at fortælle, hvad ytringsfrihed betyder for dem, og hvad det er for en kamp for ytringsfriheden, der skal kæmpes i vores globale verden

Carsten Jensen fortæller hvorledes han engang i Afghanistan, var blevet konfronteret af en lokal militsleder, der ikke kunne forstå, hvorfor vi i Danmark ikke havde slået Flemming Rose ihjel for Muhammed tegningerne. Som Jensen danser om sine svar, helt prisgivet svært bevæbnet muslimsk mentalitet, får han pludselig spørgsmålet om han er kristen

Jeg vidste godt, at jeg ikke kunne sige sandheden. At jeg ikke havde noget trosforhold, og hvis jeg troede på noget, så var det Einsteins relativitets teori, Schrödingers kat, Heisenbergs usikkerhedsprincip, ormehuller og sorte huller i en pærevælling, kort sagt universets gådefuldhed og al videns indbyggede mangelfuldhed i modsætning til al religions skråsikkerhed.

Det var derimod ikke noget problem at sige, jeg var kristen. Jeg var fra Vesten. Militssoldaten vidste, at i Vesten er vi ikke muslimer, og kristen var godt nok for ham. Det gjorde os på en vis måde til ligemænd i den forstand, at vi begge havde en Gud, der ikke måtte krænkes. Det var fint med ham, at jeg var vantro, hvis bare jeg tilhørte en afart af vantro, der var lige så militant intolerant som hans tro. Det var min forståelse, han appellerede til. Du har selv en gud, så må du da kunne forstå, at den, der krænker ham, må betale med sit liv.

Jeg kunne ikke sige, at jeg ikke troede på nogen Gud. Det ville afføde en foragt med helt uoverskuelige konsekvenser. Det ville også have helt uoverskuelige konsekvenser, hvis jeg sagde, at jeg var kristen, for så ville konklusionen i militssoldatens øjne være uundgåelig. Det ville være min pligt at sørge for, at min halvnøgne diskussionspartner fra saunaen i Norge blev slået ihjel. Og hvis jeg ikke forstod det, var jeg en dårlig kristen, der fortjente samme skånselsløse foragt som en, der ævlede løs om Schrödinger og Heisenberg.

Jensen bliver reddet da samtalen slutter grundet almindeligt muslimsk kaos. Det vender jeg tilbage til. Jensens overskrift og hans konklusion på dette muslimske optrin? “Jeg slap for at dø for Flemming Rose.” Nemlig, det var Flemming Rose der gjorde livet farligt for Jensen. Rose er åbenbart skyld i enten:

- at Carsten Jensen er rejst til Afghanistan notorisk berømt for af være fyldt med crazy fucks, som muslimer er flest

- at Carsten Jensen kommer fra Danmark

- at Danmark er et kristent land

- at Carsten Jensen er ateist

- at muslimer vil dræbe ateister og dårlige kristne

Og Jensen er ikke et øjeblik i tvivl om at det vil muslimer bare - og det lyder så meget pænere når det kommer fra ham end når det kommer fra skimlede mig.

“Intet er mig helligt” skriver Merete Pryds Helle og man må indrømme, som i Carsten Jensens tilfælde, at frimodige beskrivelser af fremmede folkeslags mentalitet hører til den kategori

Når jeg sidder i en bus i Indien med bare lår, så provokerer det. Jeg har ret til at blive vred, hvis nogen lægger en hånd på det lår, men ikke ret til at blive forbløffet.

For sådan er indere. Og det er de faktisk, men mig vil det nok ikke være beskåret at sige det samme. Det er nemlig et spørgsmål om æstetik.

Jeg lægger mærke til, at de tegninger, der provokerer så meget, som regel er elendige. Elendig kunst. Ikkekunst. Hvor er den virkelig gode kunst, der provokerer på samme måde? Er den fraværende, fordi god kunst er kompleks, og det at vise kompleksiteten ikke bliver et mål for et ensrettet had? Kan vi kræve, at folk, der ytrer sig, formår at rumme både hensynet til de andre og egen integritet? At kunst skal være god?

“For vi lever i det globalt sociale” argumenterer Helle og ophæver helt sit argument om, hvad kvinder specifikt kan vente sig i Indien, for så umiddelbart derefter at vende tilbage til sit skik følge eller land fly

I det sociale er der altid spilleregler, der afgør, hvordan det sociale spiller. Hvis man overtræder reglerne, får man problemer med resten af gruppen; hvis man holder for meget fast i reglerne, mister gruppen dynamik og udviklingsmuligheder. Det er hele tiden en balance. Hvad man kan sige på et tidspunkt og i en situation, kan man ikke sige i en anden. Man siger muntert ‘Fuck dig’ til en ven, men ikke til sin bedstemor. Man skal have tildækket sine skuldre for at gå ind i Peterskirken, og i Indien tager jeg gamacher på mine ben. Hensynet til gruppen er en måde at vise, at man vil gruppen; også selv om man ikke er en del af den. Samtidig er man også sig selv; integriteten er også vigtig. Igen gælder det om at finde balancen. Jeg indretter mig, og jeg holder fast i mig selv.

Nemlig, og her i landet har du så ikke ret til at blive forbløffet over at se grim kunst. Ligesom man ikke har ret til endnu engang at blive forbløffet over det glade vanvid på Information

Jeg bliver nødt til at forstå, at jeg provokerer. Dette er ikke et forsvar for vold, jeg foragter den voldelige reaktion. Men jeg er stolt, når tusindvis af arabere boykotter Arla, fordi de derved bruger deres demokratiske ret til at vise en forargelse.

Og jeg tænker, at reaktionen på Muhammedtegningerne var med til at starte de folkebevægelser, der førte til Det Arabiske forår. På den måde kommer kompleksiteten frem igen; jeg synes, at tegningerne er dårlige, jeg synes godt, man måtte trykke dem, men jeg synes, det var dumt, at man ikke forstod, hvor afsindigt dumt det var, at Anders Fogh Rasmussen afslog at mødes med de ambassadører. Men måske førte den (fra min side set) tåbelige provokation til en bevægelse, der har skabt afgørende forandringer i Mellemøsten og sat diskussionen om ytringsfrihed på dagsordenen der. Det er jo godt.

Ja, ytringsfrihedens veje er uransagelig, men alt i alt til det bedste. Vi forstår måske ikke, hver en sten i skoen, men det tilkommer altså ikke os at dømme.

Kirsten Thorup mener som Merete Pryds Helle i sit indlæg, hun uden ironi kalder “Det store selvmål”, at vi lever i en “globaliseret verden, hvor vi skal finde ud af at leve sammen som medmennesker og medborgere uanset hudfarve og religiøse tilhørsforhold.”. Nu er det jo forfattere af fiktion, men jeg må alligevel indskyde at vi kun lever med medborgere her i landet. Thorup mener at “Ytringsfriheden er alt for vigtig og central i et frit, demokratisk samfund til at blive patenteret af ytringsfrihedsfundamentalister” og patenterer i stedet hvad den faktisk skal bruges til

Det ville være mere relevant at rette satiren mod de religiøse, politiske, økonomiske magthavere og magtmisbrugere end mod ’de danske muslimer’, som det hed i følgeteksten til Jyllands-Postens tegninger med en generalisering af en mangfoldig og forskelligartet minoritet, hvoraf mange er flygtet fra islamiske regimer.

Det gælder i dag om at være opmærksom på den afgørende skillelinje mellem bevidst, propagandistisk hetz og hate speech mod udsatte mindretal på den ene side og på den anden side vores demokratiske ytringsfrihed, der taler magten midt imod, og som det er værd at værne om og kæmpe for.


Uden en ansvarsbevidst, åben og tolerant omgangsform i det på en gang lokale og globale offentlige rum, vi befinder os i, ender den frie demokratiske debat i en narcissistisk skyttegravskrig styret af fordomme, stereotyper og fjendebilleder.

Thorup kender desværre ikke tolerance, som ikke udvises af den der ytrer, men af den der lytter. Og hun ser måske heller ikke, at man måske ikke befinder sig så meget i det globale offentlige rum, når man skriver på dansk i et meget lille dansk dagblad, hvis hovedintægtskilde er dansk mediestøtte, givet af danske skatteydere fordi danske politikere mente, at den danske del af det globale offentlige rum, trængte til marginale stemmer. Til gengæld kender hun, som det mere og mere synes at være forfattere til del, muslimens mentalitet, hvis ”forudsigelige vredesreaktioner” det er en “selvopfyldende profeti”  at udfordre. Og den mentalitet lyder ikke rar. Livsfarlig endda, som Jensen kunne berette.

Kristina Stoltz fortæller en genuint morsom barndomsanekdote om første gang hendes far så “En neger på en cykel”, som han kaldte hele familien hen til vinduet for at se. Men alting var ikke bedre i gamle dage, faktisk var det “forrykt”. “For mange danskere er det som at få stukket en rød klud op i ansigtet, at blive dikteret, at der er ord, man ikke må bruge” forklarer hun, som en modsætning til sin amerikanske negermands californske politiske korrekthed. Men heldigvis gælder danskernes forrykte stanpunkt ikke for nutidens og fremtidens samfund af lurende konflikt

Et standpunkt som for min eksmand, hvis aner var en skønsom blanding af irske, litauiske, jamaicanske plus den ubekendte slavekoloniale, ikke fattede et pløk af – naturligvis ikke, han var født og opvokset i det multikulturelle Californien, hvor han havde fået ind med modermælken, at sprog og omgangstone var af afgørende betydning for, at så forskellige befolkningsgrupper kunne leve side om side.


Vi er ikke længere et homogent etnisk, mere eller mindre renskuret land med et par enkelte rastafarier inde på Gammel Torv, tre-fire gæstearbejdere fra Pakistan og de grønlændere, der altid hører til, nej, vi er blevet et multikulturelt samfund, om vi kan lide det eller ej. Og vi vil forblive et multikulturelt samfund, om vi kan lide det eller ej. Ydermere er vi blevet en del af en global offentlighed. Spørgsmålet er så bare, om vi trods denne multikulturelle virkelighed vil holde stædigt fast på vores homogene selvopfattelse, hvilket indtil videre har indbefattet retten til at tale, skrive og tegne, som vi vil, uden tanke for hvordan vores udtalelser bliver opfattet af folk med andre kulturelle og religiøse baggrunde. Og uden tanke for de langsigtede følgevirkninger af vores mulige tilbagevendende, mere eller mindre tilsigtede krænkelser.

Stolz kloger sig, trods sit intime forhold til sin negermand, ikke på specifikke multikulturelle etniciteter i den globale offentlighed, med særlig interesse for danske forhold. Men hun kender nok til “dem” at de udgør en samlet masse, som ikke kan forstå og leve med vores homogene ytringer. Ja, de kan heller ikke kan lære det, fanget som de er i rigid stereotypi - og vi er fanget med dem. Eller er det af dem? Under alle omstændigheder hæver den danske forrykte mentalitet sig således over den globale offentlighed ved åbenbart at være den eneste, der er i stand til at forandre sig, om det så er til det værre. Vi kan, som de eneste i globale offentlighed, i hvert fald ikke holde på hvem vi er, om vi kan lide det eller ej og sådan er det bare.

For Stoltz er det logisk, ja uproblematisk, hvis endda ikke ønskeligt, at multikulturalisme undergraver demokratiet ved at det umuliggør ytringsfrihed. Demokrati betyder folkestyre, altså et styre der forudsætter et folk. Og når så folket endda er forrykt så kan afskaffelsen vel kun gå for langsomt.


Neger og hvid pige hed billedet og en fotograf blev sendt ud for at dokumentere det for læserne i 1962

Thomas Boberg redder dagen, selv om det ikke er uden bekymringer. For Boberg er “Situationen kompleks” og han mener ligesom sine fire kvindelige forfatterkollegaer at “Vi er en del af en globaliseret verden”. Og så køber han til fulde ideen om at indvandringen er en trussel mod demokratiet, men mener optimistisk at “det må være muligt at arbejde for en bedre integration uden at give køb på ytringsfriheden”. Integration, ikke assimilering. De vilde kan aldrig lære at blive som os, men måske kan de gå fredeligt rundt i vores gader?

Dogmatisk religion er dybt problematisk. At Gud og samtlige profeter ikke er større, end at en lille tegning kan krænke, er for mig en gåde og appellerer ikke til min respekt. Det er nok, fordi fundamentalistisk religion snarere end individuel tro drejer sig om magt, ensretning og kontrol. Vi kan som samfund naturligvis aldrig acceptere, at religion ikke skal kunne være genstand for kritik. Dog finder jeg det heller ikke nødvendigt konstant at slynge om sig med hån, spot og latterliggørelse. Man må sgu da tænke sig om. Det handler om at finde en måde at leve sammen på, og det må foregå i et rum, hvor enhver kritik og enhver ytring er en ret. Vi må holde fast i det frie ords frie dialog. »Jeg er uenig i, hvad De siger, men jeg vil til døden forsvare Deres ret til at sige det.« (Evelyn Beatrice Hall).

Sproget er ikke statisk, det udvikler sig med tiden, med os. At skrive er også at lytte til virkeligheden. Derfor må forfatterens sprogarbejde hele tiden være i bevægelse. Opmærksomt, antiautoritært, udogmatisk, kritisk, humoristisk. Visse digtere mener, at der er ord og ting, man af forskellige politiske grunde ikke bør skrive. Jeg er uenig. Alle ord er brugbare. Det afhænger af sammenhængen. Et ord kan synes rigtigt i en tekst, men helt forkert og usmageligt i en anden. Sådan er det jo at skrive, man vælger til og fra. Det vil være misforstået at undlade at skrive dette eller hint, fordi en politisk agenda derude dikterer det. Det vil være (selv)censur. Og den frie digtnings død. Og dermed også vejen mod det frie samfunds ophør.

Og sådan er det for de pæne. De kan tale imod ytringsfrihed og demokrati fordi de respekterer mennesker, de mener er morderiske, uden evne til selvkontrol og udvikling. De kan besynge at samfundet bliver stadigt mere som en krudttønde, hvor vi i stadigt højere grad skal kende diplomatiets subtile kunst for ikke at antænde det hele.

I min forrykte barndom var angsten for at træde på sociale konventioner, hvad der kendetegnede det provensielle. Nu er det, hvad der kendetegner den store verden. Hvordan flygter man fra den globale landsby?

Muslimerkongen er død

Kong Abdullah af Saudiarabien er død og verdens statsledere har udtalt deres sorg over den store mand. Her nogle reaktioner samlet af den venstreorienterede Think Progress

King Abdullah, 90, who died early Friday morning, is being hailed as a reformer, despite condoning human rights abuses and forwarding only very measured efforts to promote democracy in his oil-rich nation.

One of the most scrutinized aspects of the Saudi Arabia’s rights’ record is its so-called “male guardianship system,” women are not allowed to travel, obtain a passport, marry, or continue their education without the approval of a male relative.

The King’s own daughters are hardly an exception to the harsh rule. Four of his daughters claim that the are being forcibly held in a dilapidated palace with little in the way of food and water. “Our father said that we had no way out,” Sahar Al Saud, 42, wrote in an email to the British broadcast network Channel 4, “And that after his death our brothers will continue detaining us.”

“We are just an example of so many families, of what so many women, go through. Just a tiny, tiny example,” the princess who once enjoyed international skiing and shopping trips said.


President Barack Obama praised the king for having “the courage of his convictions,” and for promoting security in the region, but steered clear of commenting on Saudi Arabian social policies.

“In a very discreet way, he was a strong advocate of women,” Christine Lagarde the head of the International Monetary Fund said from the Davos Economic Forum in Switzerland.

Even news reports heralded King Abdullah’s track record on civil rights, though the laudatory language was often followed by only vague or contradictory examples from his 9-year tenure as the head of Saudi Arabia.

CNN called him “a cautious reformer” citing “steps toward broader freedoms” without giving clear examples. The New York Times Douglas Martin and Ben Hubbard referred to the autocratic ruler as a “force of moderation,” although the already tempered phrase was followed by examples in which the King failed to carry out the reforms he publicly vowed to carry out.


On Friday, Saudi authorities again postponed the flogging of the progressive blogger Raif Badawi. Although the British foreign secretary raised concerns about brutal sentence awaiting the blogger with the Saudi ambassador to Britain prime minister was among those praising King Abdullah’s commitment to his people.

“He will be remembered for his long years of service to the kingdom, for his commitment to peace and for strengthening understanding between faiths,” David Cameron said.


Flere og overlappende reaktioner her. Også tidligere præsident George Bush var ked af den store mands død, som han skrev på Facebook

“Laura and I are saddened by the death of a man I admire and with whom I was honored to work. I have very fond memories of my visits to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and of the King’s visit to our ranch in Crawford. He was an important and able ally and a force for modernization in his country. King Abdullah served his nation honorably with strength and vision. We send our heartfelt condolences to the King’s family and all who will miss him.”


Islam opstod, som bekendt, på den arabiske halvø som en kodificering af arabisk kultur og moral. Som islam spredte sig udvikledes et væld af variationer, så man hurtigt ikke længere kunne tale om et islam. Seneste skud på stammen er islamisk stat, hvis forskelle og ligheder i forhold til den saudiske variant gør enhver islamofob til skamme. Washington Post stiller det pædagogisk op


Disses væsensforskellige forskel i samfundsindretning kommer af den fleksibilitet, der er i islams lære, her i sammenligning med koranen

Og i praksis er der da også milevid forskel på Islamisk stat og kalifatet. Daily Telegraph skriver om lov og orden i den nye Islamisk Stat

On January 15, 2015, the Islamic State (ISIS) released a collection of images showing the enforcement of the hudud (Koranic punishment) in Ninawa, Iraq. The images show the execution of two men convicted of homosexuality by throwing them from a tall building; the crucifixion of two men convicted of armed theft; and the stoning of a woman convicted of adultery.



Således holdes der også orden i Saudiarabien på åben gade

Som man kan se, helt forskellige straffemetoder, der vidner om islams mange ansigter. Men det er den samme folkelige deltagelse, der vidner om islam som fredens religion

Dokumentar: ISIS Sex-Slave Raping & Selling Girls

En tidligere Associated Press journalist beskriver mediernes anti-israelske fortælling

Matti Friedman arbejdede for det store nyhedsbureau Associated Press i Jerusalem mellem 2006 og 2011 og skønt han erklærer sig selv som venstredrejet (liberal i amerikansk terminologi) kan han ikke længere stå inde for, hvad han betegner som “a hostile obsession with Israel” i den almindelige nyhedsdækning. I en længere og højst anbefalelsesværdig artikel fra august i år i Tablet Magazine fortæller han om den overeksponering af Israel med sin tidligere arbejdsgiver som illustrativt eksempel. At de havde mere end 40 medarbejdere til at dække Israel-Palæstina, hvilket var mere end resten af Mellemøsten til sammen og kun ved særlige lejligheder vægtes andet end Israel højest.

To offer a sense of scale: Before the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the permanent AP presence in that country consisted of a single regime-approved stringer. The AP’s editors believed, that is, that Syria’s importance was less than one-40th that of Israel. I don’t mean to pick on the AP—the agency is wholly average, which makes it useful as an example. The big players in the news business practice groupthink, and these staffing arrangements were reflected across the herd. Staffing levels in Israel have decreased somewhat since the Arab uprisings began, but remain high. And when Israel flares up, as it did this summer, reporters are often moved from deadlier conflicts. Israel still trumps nearly everything else.

The volume of press coverage that results, even when little is going on, gives this conflict a prominence compared to which its actual human toll is absurdly small. In all of 2013, for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict claimed 42 lives—that is, roughly the monthly homicide rate in the city of Chicago. Jerusalem, internationally renowned as a city of conflict, had slightly fewer violent deaths per capita last year than Portland, Ore., one of America’s safer cities. In contrast, in three years the Syrian conflict has claimed an estimated 190,000 lives, or about 70,000 more than the number of people who have ever died in the Arab-Israeli conflict since it began a century ago.

News organizations have nonetheless decided that this conflict is more important than, for example, the more than 1,600 women murdered in Pakistan last year (271 after being raped and 193 of them burned alive), the ongoing erasure of Tibet by the Chinese Communist Party, the carnage in Congo (more than 5 million dead as of 2012) or the Central African Republic, and the drug wars in Mexico (death toll between 2006 and 2012: 60,000), let alone conflicts no one has ever heard of in obscure corners of India or Thailand. They believe Israel to be the most important story on earth, or very close.

Det der er vigtigt i en Israel-Palæstina historie, argumenterer Friedman, er Israel. Palæstinenserne anerkendes ikke som selvstændige aktører  og eksisterer kun som passive ofre. Korruption er altid interessant, men kun israelsk. Friedman fortæller at han ikke kunne komme igennem med en artikel om palæstinensisk korruption fordi “that was not the story”. Således angribes enhver skævhed i det israelske samfund nidkært; Israelsks lovforslag til pressefrihed, antallet af ortodokse jøder, bosættelser, kønssegregering osv, mens der er meget få artikler om lignende palæstinensiske forhold.

Hamas formålserklæring, som handler om et udslette Israel og alle jøderne og deres graven terrortunneller ind under Israel er ikke vigtigt for medier og nyhedsbureauer, men det er derimod Israels angreb på Hamas. De fleste rapportere, siger Friedman, opfatter essensen af deres arbejde at rapportere om israelske overgreb: “That’s the essens of the Israel story”!

Og denne fortælling sættes ind i den ramme der hedder Israel-Palæstina konflikten eller variationer heraf. Her er det Israel, der er den store og dermed aggressoren hvor sandheden er at jøderne kun optager 0,2% af Mellemøsten og der er 5 millioner jøder overfor 300 mio. arabere. Det var den samlede arabiske verden, der ville udslette Israel fra begyndelsen og den palæstinensiske sag blev først interessant efter 1967 krigen, hvor Israel indtog de resterende områder fra delingsplanen fra Ægypten og Jordan, der ellers havde annekteret dem uden protester fra den arabiske verden.

For centuries, stateless Jews played the role of a lightning rod for ill will among the majority population. They were a symbol of things that were wrong. Did you want to make the point that greed was bad? Jews were greedy. Cowardice? Jews were cowardly. Were you a Communist? Jews were capitalists. Were you a capitalist? In that case, Jews were Communists. Moral failure was the essential trait of the Jew. It was their role in Christian tradition—the only reason European society knew or cared about them in the first place.


When the people responsible for explaining the world to the world, journalists, cover the Jews’ war as more worthy of attention than any other, when they portray the Jews of Israel as the party obviously in the wrong, when they omit all possible justifications for the Jews’ actions and obscure the true face of their enemies, what they are saying to their readers—whether they intend to or not—is that Jews are the worst people on earth. The Jews are a symbol of the evils that civilized people are taught from an early age to abhor. International press coverage has become a morality play starring a familiar villain.


You don’t need to be a history professor, or a psychiatrist, to understand what’s going on. Having rehabilitated themselves against considerable odds in a minute corner of the earth, the descendants of powerless people who were pushed out of Europe and the Islamic Middle East have become what their grandparents were—the pool into which the world spits. The Jews of Israel are the screen onto which it has become socially acceptable to project the things you hate about yourself and your own country. The tool through which this psychological projection is executed is the international press.

Men det er på alle måder den forkerte historie der fortælles, skriver Friedman. Reportere ser alt gennem en israelsk optik og ser derfor ikke islams undertrykkelse og forfølgelse af minoriteter, hvor der med ISIS nu er tale om folkemord

A knowledgeable observer of the Middle East cannot avoid the impression that the region is a volcano and that the lava is radical Islam, an ideology whose various incarnations are now shaping this part of the world. Israel is a tiny village on the slopes of the volcano. Hamas is the local representative of radical Islam and is openly dedicated to the eradication of the Jewish minority enclave in Israel, just as Hezbollah is the dominant representative of radical Islam in Lebanon, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and so forth.

Hamas is not, as it freely admits, party to the effort to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel. It has different goals about which it is quite open and that are similar to those of the groups listed above. Since the mid 1990s, more than any other player, Hamas has destroyed the Israeli left, swayed moderate Israelis against territorial withdrawals, and buried the chances of a two-state compromise. That’s one accurate way to frame the story.

Men i mediernes og nyhedsbureauernes fortælling er Israel vulkanen, en vulkan der ikke eksisterer i den sammen geopolitiske virkelighed som resten af Melleøsten. Historen om Israel er ikke om nyheder men om “something else”.

Martin Lidegaard beskyldes for uvidenhed

Bent Jensen har i Jyllands-Posten ikke tiltro til Martin Lidegaards basale viden om Mellemøsten og vil gerne vide, hvad Lidegaard egentlig mener Israel skal gøre

Hver gang jeg ser og hører ham tale så tilsyneladende forstandigt og overbevisende, spørger jeg mig selv: Ved manden i virkeligheden, hvad han taler om? Er han ordentligt inde i sagerne? Har han læst på lektien, og har hans embedsmænd forsynet ham med alle de nødvendige oplysninger om konfliktens rødder – og jeg understreger alle? Eller lader han blot munden løbe?

Det meste af Mellemøsten befinder sig i et omfattende kaos. Israels nabostat Syrien er hærget af en blodig borgerkrig, der foreløbig har kostet 200.000 mennesker livet og drevet millioner på flugt. Oprørsstyrkerne i Syrien har svoret at ville udslette Israel. Det samme har Assad-regimet i Damaskus. For nylig flygtede de udstationerede FN-styrker fra syrisk territorium. Hvorhen? Til Israel, hvor de fandt sikkerhed.


Jeg synes i fuld alvor, at Lidegaard skulle forholde sig seriøst til de reelle problemer, der her er omtalt. Og der er flere endnu. Hvorfor behandler han palæstinenserne som uansvarlige børn? Hvorfor stiller han ikke krav til dem, hvis de vil have egen stat? Hvorfor siger Lidegaard & Co ikke til både Hamas-lederne og til Abbas og hans mafia i Ramallah, at de skal standse myrderierne på jøder og indstille deres anti-jødiske hadkampagner i skolebøger og i palæstinensiske medier – inklusive de officielle trykte og elektroniske Hamas- og PS-medier.

Som ansvarlig minister ved Lidegaard naturligvis, at disse afskyelige hadkampagner kører hele tiden. Men hvordan forestiller han sig så, at der skal kunne blive fred og fordragelighed mellem jøder og arabere på det diminutive område, som Israel og selvstyreområdet udgør, når den ene part hele tiden dyrker hadet til den anden part, nægter dens ret til eksistens og vil have en jødefri zone?

Samtidig skrev en foruroliget Flemming Rose ligeledes i Jyllands-Posten om Lidegaards manglende viden om Rusland

I weekenden bragte Berlingske et interview med udenrigsminister Martin Lidegaard. Ministeren afslørede her en sjælden uvidenhed om russisk økonomis tilstand, effekten af sanktioner, og hvad der venter i den nærmeste fremtid. Interviewet var aftalt på forhånd, så der er ikke tale om, at Lidegaard uden varsel fik stukket en mikrofon i hovedet.

Det gør hans udtalelser foruroligende, for hvis kendskabet til Rusland, Danmarks største sikkerhedspolitiske udfordring, ikke er større, så er risikoen stor for at begå fatale fejl. En anden mulighed er selvfølgelig, at Lidegaard bevidst misinformerer, men det gør det ikke bedre. Om russisk økonomi siger han:

»Noget af det mest bekymrende er, at den russiske økonomi er i frit fald. Vi står over for en reel risiko for russisk økonomisk kollaps. Det skyldes vores sanktioner kombineret med en stærkt faldende oliepris. Underskuddet i staten stiger, inflationen stiger voldsomt. Den almindelige russers købekraft bliver udhulet dag for dag.«

I fredags, altså nogenlunde samtidig med at Lidegaard fremsatte sin dystre vurdering, noterede The Wall Street Journal, at Rusland med en vækst på 0,8 pct. i årets første ti måneder har klaret sig bedre end ventet, på niveau med eurozonen. Det får ikke én til at tænke på en økonomi i frit fald.

I virkeligheden passer Lidegaards udtalelser på et andet land i regionen, nemlig Ukraine, der befinder sig på randen af en finansiel nedsmeltning.

Lidegaard må lægge sig lidt mere i selen, hvis virkeligheden skal moraliseres væk. Begge indlæg bør læses i deres helhed, hvis man vil vide mere end Lidegaard.

Farlige Frank og brosten mod Berlingske og borgerne

Berlingske Tidende er raget uklar med den socialdemokratisk ledede Københavns kommune over forholdene i bydelen Tingbjerg. Ulrik Vogel, Præsten der blev fordrevet fra Tingbjerg beskrev nemlig sig gamle sogn som et sted, hvor banderne tager over når mørket falder på, som mafiaen på Sicilien. Samme dag kunne man læse “En Tingbjerghistorie“, som fortalt af ‘Søren A.C. Stenbøg, stud.jur., frivillig i Diakoniens Hus i Tingbjerg’

Det kunne være historien om en ældre dame, der gennem en årrække blev udsat for utallige indbrud, uden at politiet kom forbi og undersøgte sagen.

Det kunne være historien om en mand, der blev mødt med alvorlige trusler, hvis han ikke hævede sin kontanthjælp og gav pengene til kriminelle unge sidste hverdag i hver måned. Igen uden at politiet regerede aktivt på anmeldelsen.

Endelig kunne det være historien om førtidspensionisten, som oplevede trusler og forulempelser, der sidste år kulminerede i en afbrændt bil og hærværk mod hendes ejendom. Alt dette fordi hun havde konfronteret nogle mennesker med deres kriminelle aktivitet. I denne historie kunne politiet ikke skabe tryghed for hende og heller ikke opklare forbrydelserne. Derfor henvendte hun sig til boligselskabet og ønskede at flytte. Hun fik her at vide, at det var lejernes eget ansvar at føle sig trygge. Det kunne de gøre ved f.eks. video-overvågning.

Senere er der åbnet mulighed for en anden bolig, der dog ikke opfylder de fysiske behov, som hendes kroniske sygdom ellers burde berettige til. Ligeledes ville hun også være nødt til at aflive sin hund.

Fælles for disse historier er, at ofrene er blandt de absolut svageste i samfundet. Fælles er desværre også, at myndighederne ser passivt til og svigter personerne.

Og om ‘John’, der flygtede fra Tingbjerg fordi “De kriminelle begyndte at rekruttere unge under 15 år, fordi de vidste, at unge ikke fængsles i Danmark. Det skræmte mig, at der var lagt sådan en strategi, og jeg blev nervøs for mine børn”. Det fik Overborgmester Frank Jensen til tasterne med en reprimande til borgerene om ikke at sætte spørgsmålstegn ved socialdemokraternes politik eller fortælle om deres oplevelser i velfærdssamfundet

Tingbjerg har ikke brug for mediepanik og råben op om mafia og parallelsamfund. Tingbjerg har ikke brug for at være dørmåtte og rekvisit i en kommende valgkamp. Tingbjergs elever, som kæmper for deres flotte karakterer, har ikke brug for at få deres kvarter stemplet som lovløst.

Og for at understege Overborgmester Frank Jensens pointe med hvor godt det går med tryghedsskabelsen i Tingbjerg fik Ulrich Vogel en brosten gennem sit vindue. Kom ikke og påstå at Frank Jensen ikke er i tråd med sine vælgere. Så for at imødegå at Tingbjerg bliver en “rekvisit i en kommende valgkamp“ nævner overborgmesteren at han “i tre år [har] kæmpet for en ændring af planloven, så vi får 20 procent almene boliger i nye attraktive boligområder

Alene i kommunens budget for 2015 har vi sat penge af til ni indsatser. Vi satser blandt andet på feriecamps for udsatte børn, og så har vi afsat 25 millioner kr. til cykelstier, som åbner Tingbjerg mod resten af byen. Vi har også sat penge af til en udredning af mulighederne for en letbane. Vi kan styrke den positive udvikling. Men den langsigtede løsning på problemet med udsatte boligområder er et andet – nemlig at skabe en reel blandet by, hvor socialt udsatte ikke er koncentreret i enkeltområder.

og hvis det stod til overborgmesteren så “skal fremtidens by ikke bestå af store områder kun med almene boliger på de billige grunde og store områder kun med private luksusbyggerier på de attraktive grunde ved havnen“. Men Tingbjerg stod faktisk til socialdemokraterne, som fik hele området designet som et ualmindeligt lækkert sted til den almindelige lønmodtager. Som man kan læse på Wikipedea (hvis ikke Frank Jensen har ændret artiklens indhold siden)

Kommunen valgte den kendte arkitekt og byplanlægger Steen Eiler Rasmussen til at tegne den selvstændige byenhed Tingbjerg, der skulle falde ind i det åbne landskab. Derfor måtte der højst bygges i tre etager, bortset fra højhuset, som skulle camouflere den oprindelige varmecentral. Steen Eiler Rasmussen planlagde i1950′erne Tingbjerg sammen med arkitekt og havearkitekt C.Th. Sørensen. De tegnede en mønsterby – en by i byen – efter engelsk forbillede beplantet med træer, bærbuske og rosenpergolaer. Området fik egen kirke, skole, butiks­strøg og et stort udbud af institutioner, bl.a. en af landets første byggelegepladser. Alt sammen skulle det være med til at skabe rammen om det gode liv. I de mange grønne haverum mellem husene blev der skabt god plads til, at børn kunne lege og naboer mødes. Tingbjerg blev opført over en 15-årig periode fra slutningen af 1950′erne til begyndelsen af 1970′erne.

Tingbjerg er et lækkert sted, men det er beboersammensætningen ikke. Tingbjergs deroute er fulgt med socialdemokraternes despekt for det danske folk og deres almindelige socialistiske foragt for individet.

Søndagsfilm: Battle of Kosovo

Yugoslavisk film med engelske undertekster.

Battle of Kosovo is a 1989 Yugoslav historical drama/war film filmed in Serbia. The film was based on the drama written by poet Ljubomir Simovi?. It depicts the historical Battle of Kosovo between Medieval Serbia and the Ottoman Empire which took place on 15 June 1389 (according to the Julian calendar, 28 June 1389 by the Gregorian calendar) in a field about 5 kilometers northwest of Pristina.
Serbian duke Lazar in 1389. refuses to obey the Turk sultan Murat who is penetrating towards Serbia with great army, in order to conquer Europe through it. Although aware that he is weaker, without enough army, duke Lazar decides to confront him. Serbian lords are not united. Most of them wants to fight, even if the price is defeat, but some of them hesitate. Everyone fit for weapon is sent to Kosovo field. The battle on Kosovo, in 1389. ended with no winners - both armies shed blood and got tired. Lazar and Murat died. But, nevertheless, the battle of Kosovo was a victory, not for Serbian state, which soon became Turkish, but for Europe, which Serbia rescued with bodies of her heroes of the first and the strongest Turkish attack…

The film was released in 1989, which marked the 600th anniversary of the Battle.

Robert Spencer om hvorvidt Islamisk Stat er islamisk

Kulturen, naturen og fremmedlegemet

Guardian fortæller om en heltemodig katolsk præst Fader Kinvi i Congo, der med fare for sit liv redder muslimer fra animistiske militsers hævnangreb. Fader Kinvi tror på “the contagion of love” og det kræver mere end almindelig vilje midt i sekteriske blodigheder. Og det er et af menneskets fineste egenskaber. Men det er idioti ikke. Og idioti er at invitere hadet indenfor og med vilje og magt konstruere forudsætningerne for sekterisk vold. Og ondskab er at forråde og bekæmpe sin egen befolkning, mens man konstruerer sin fremtidige sekteriske samfund

Fader Kinvi redder mennesker i nød fordi troen på næstekærlighed er stærk i ham. Men det er ikke næstekærlighed at ophøje fjendtlige ideologier til ligeværdighed. En kvinde blev eskorteret ud af The National Cathedral i Washington for at protestere over at den blev brugt til et muslimsk arrangement. Robert Spencer støtter kvindens argumentation i, hvor direkte antikristent islam og islamiske bønner er på Jihad Watch og skriver

It all sounds so high-minded: the Rev. Canon Gina Campbell says: “This needs to be a world in which all are free to believe and practice and in which we avoid bigotry, Islamaphobia, racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Christianity and to embrace our humanity and to embrace faith.”

But someone threw a rotting cabbage on their lovely sofa, as DCist laments: “And because love, respect and understanding is too much of a concept for some people to understand, a person interrupted the service. Of course.” Still, the spectacle of a woman being forcibly ejected from what is ostensibly a Christian cathedral for proclaiming that Jesus Christ is Lord just before Muslim prayers are about to begin is at very least evidence that we live in strange times.


In light of all that, and the ongoing and escalating Muslim persecution of Christians worldwide, wouldn’t it have been more appropriate, so as to promote love, respect and understanding and all that, to have Christian prayers in a mosque? After all, it is Muslims who are persecuting Christians worldwide, and the National Cathedral decides to show its good will and love for Muslims by inviting Hamas-linked Muslim Brotherhood front groups to pray there. Why doesn’t the ADAMS Center show its good will and love for Christians by inviting Christians to pray in the mosque there?

This woman who disrupted the service was upset that a building dedicated to the worship of Christ had been given over for the use of people who believe that her proclamation of Christ is a blasphemous falsehood and that her beliefs are a perversion of the true teachings of Jesus the Muslim prophet.

Den muslimske bønneleder talte derefter for den amerikanske kongres hvor han også ledte bønnen, skriver Freedom Outpost

With newly re-elected Speaker of the House John Boehner presiding AND BOWING HIS HEAD, the Imam for the Islamic Center of Central Jersey praised Islam’s Allah from the House floor as the God who reigns supreme. Here is the shocking video of Imam Hamad Chebli delivering the Islamic prayer; Boehner can be seen behind him

We’re not talking about a harmless, moderate Imam here. Instead, we’re talking about a major devil.


The selection of Chelbi also appears to have significance relative to the U.S. policy in Syria. Both his mentor Khaled – and Khaled’s father – were killed by the Syrian regime. As such, Chelbi has an axe to grind when it comes to Bashar al-Assad. With news that the Obama administration is actually considering a policy based on an absurd premise that the best way to defeat ISIS is to remove Assad from power, Chelbi’s appearance at locations of national significance seem to coincide with this potential shift in U.S. policy.

Despite western portrayals of Chelbi as a moderate, he absolutely is not.

When it comes to Muslim prayers being delivered on the House floor or at the National Cathedral, unfortunately, this is not new. The precedent was set by Boehner’s predecessor – Speaker Dennis Hastert – less than one year prior to 9/11. As for the National Cathedral, none other than President George W. Bush shared a podium with Muzammil Siddiqi, then president of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA).

First up, on February 7, 2001, Chairman of the Dar al-Hijrah mosque Bassam Estwani delivered a prayer on the floor of the House as well. As the chairman of Dar al-Hijrah, Estwani represented perhaps the most notorious mosque on American soil. It was visited by three of the 9/11 hijackers and was home to Anwar al-Awlaki, the inspiration for the Fort Hood shooter. Estwani was the chairman of the mosque at that time:

Mennesket er rundet af sin kultur. Det har visioner, overvejelser og håb og frygt. Naturen har kun konsekvens.

Tid for vold

Det er søndag, det blæser en stiv pelikan og det er koldt og vådt, så måske er det tid til en bulgarsk film om Balkans erfaringer med Osmannerriget?

A Bulgarian film, Time of Violence uses precisely the same stylistic conventions as American films, the same form of storytelling, the same approach to character, the same values as to what makes a good story, and, moreover, it satisfies American criteria for being a good movie. There is a basic story, with well-attached subplots, lots of action, villains and heros (with a bit more complexity, perhaps, than most American films), and a logical resolution. The production values are high, the performances excellent, the direction skillful. The film has done very well in many countries, including some as foreign to Bulgarian culture as Japan. So why can’t the filmmakers get any distribution deal in the U.S.?

Time of Violence suffers only from its language and its setting. Few Americans know much about the Balkans during the 17th century. But it was one of those proverbial “interesting” times during which it was a curse to live. Most of the Balkans were under the thumb of the Ottoman empire. Islamic empires have more of a reputation for tolerance than most, but the Ottoman empire was showing its ugliest face during this period in Bulgaria. Bulgaria was a strategically important area inhabited by unreliable Christian subjects. The sultan decided that they must all convert to Islam, or die.

Time of Violence focuses on the fate of one valley during this crisis. The son of the miller was taken off by the Turks years ago, while still a boy, to become a janissary. Janissaries were special troops used by the Ottomans. Recruited (involuntarily) from Christian boys, they were separated from their families at an early age, indoctrinated in Islam, and turned into fiercely reliable troops with no allegiance to anyone but the sultan. The miller’s son is now a highly trusted janissary, with the task of converting his entire home valley to Islam. But the people there take their religion very seriously, and will not submit. The janissary becomes more and more brutal in his attempts to convert the valley, for he must slaughter them all if they don’t take the turban.

The film is painted on a large, sweeping canvas, with many characters and subplots, all cleverly woven into a single story. (This accomplishment is even more remarkable when you consider that the original Bulgarian version was nearly two hours longer, yet there is no sign at all that anything has been cut.) And, surprisingly, this isn’t a “vile Turk” story. Director Ludmil Staikov has much more ambitious goals, including an examination of the power of religion and of the destructiveness of violence and fanaticism. Not all of the Christians are good, nor all of the Muslims bad. The Turkish governor of the valley is not loved by his subjects, yet does all he can to avert their doom. He is given a beautiful, tender moment as he leaves the valley forever, in disgrace. Crossing a bridge that leads out of his valley, he notices a stone that has worked out of place. He gets down from his horse, carefully puts the stone back into its place, and then proceeds on to his exile. Even the janissary has his complexities, as he truly wants to spare his people from unnecessary pain, despite having completely transferred his loyalties to the sultan. The screenplay, by Staikov, Georgi Danailov, Mihail Kirkov, and Radoslav Spassov, provides complex shadings of characters and motivations.

Time of Violence is a professionally made film, beautifully photographed, well edited, and with scrupulous care in costuming and set design. The period atmosphere feels perfectly authentic, at least to someone with only passing familiarity with the time and place. The technical aspects of the film are well up to the standard of moderate budget Hollywood movies.

There are some unpleasant moments of torture and brutality in Time of Violence, but they do not exist to excite or titillate. Rather, they are necessary to demonstrate the full scope of the tragedy. Still, some viewers may find themselves looking away during certain scenes. But, otherwise, Time of Violence is a film without flaws. There are no particularly weak points in the film, and many great virtues.

Først kommer lørdag…

Først kommer lørdag, så kommer søndag, hedder den islamiske drøm om at slagte først jøderne og så de kristne. En ikke helt ny dokumentar, man ganske god at få indsigt af.

Den arabiske verden knækker under vægten af kognitiv dissonans

Der har den seneste tid været flere gode artikler om den arabiske verdens store krise. Det man optimistisk kaldte for et forår har helt mistet en årstidbetegnelse thi en sådan vil ikke være dækkende. En vinter er jo kun en periode, men flere ser ikke nogen umiddelbar ende på den spiral af kaos, som araberne ser ud til at blive trukket ned i. Den libanesiske Hisham Melhem skrev den glimrende artikel Barbarians Within Our Gates for Politico Magazine

Arab civilization, such as we knew it, is all but gone. The Arab world today is more violent, unstable, fragmented and driven by extremism—the extremism of the rulers and those in opposition—than at any time since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century ago. Every hope of modern Arab history has been betrayed. The promise of political empowerment, the return of politics, the restoration of human dignity heralded by the season of Arab uprisings in their early heydays—all has given way to civil wars, ethnic, sectarian and regional divisions and the reassertion of absolutism, both in its military and atavistic forms. With the dubious exception of the antiquated monarchies and emirates of the Gulf—which for the moment are holding out against the tide of chaos—and possibly Tunisia, there is no recognizable legitimacy left in the Arab world.

Is it any surprise that, like the vermin that take over a ruined city, the heirs to this self-destroyed civilization should be the nihilistic thugs of the Islamic State? And that there is no one else who can clean up the vast mess we Arabs have made of our world but the Americans and Western countries?

No one paradigm or one theory can explain what went wrong in the Arab world in the last century. There is no obvious set of reasons for the colossal failures of all the ideologies and political movements that swept the Arab region: Arab nationalism, in its Baathist and Nasserite forms; various Islamist movements; Arab socialism; the rentier state and rapacious monopolies, leaving in their wake a string of broken societies. No one theory can explain the marginalization of Egypt, once the center of political and cultural gravity in the Arab East, and its brief and tumultuous experimentation with peaceful political change before it reverted back to military rule.

Nor is the notion of “ancient sectarian hatreds” adequate to explain the frightening reality that along a front stretching from Basra at the mouth of the Persian Gulf to Beirut on the Mediterranean there exists an almost continuous bloodletting between Sunni and Shia—the public manifestation of an epic geopolitical battle for power and control pitting Iran, the Shia powerhouse, against Saudi Arabia, the Sunni powerhouse, and their proxies.

There is no one single overarching explanation for that tapestry of horrors in Syria and Iraq, where in the last five years more than a quarter of a million people perished, where famed cities like Aleppo, Homs and Mosul were visited by the modern terror of Assad’s chemical weapons and the brutal violence of the Islamic State. How could Syria tear itself apart and become—like Spain in the 1930s—the arena for Arabs and Muslims to re-fight their old civil wars? The war waged by the Syrian regime against civilians in opposition areas combined the use of Scud missiles, anti-personnel barrel bombs as well as medieval tactics against towns and neighborhoods such as siege and starvation. For the first time since the First World War, Syrians were dying of malnutrition and hunger.


A byproduct of the depredation of the national security state and resurgent Islamism has been the slow death of the cosmopolitanism that distinguished great Middle Eastern cities like Alexandria, Beirut, Cairo and Damascus. Alexandria was once a center of learning and multicultural delights (by night, Mark Twain wrote in Innocents Abroad, “it was a sort of reminiscence of Paris”). Today Alexandria is a hotbed of political Islam, now that the once large Greek-Egyptian community has fled along with the other non-Arab and non-Muslim communities. Beirut, once the most liberal city in the Levant, is struggling to maintain a modicum of openness and tolerance while being pushed by Hezbollah to become a Tehran on the Med. Over the last few decades, Islamists across the region have encouraged—and pressured—women to wear veils, men to show signs of religiosity, and subtly and not-so-subtly intimidated non-conformist intellectuals and artists. Egypt today is bereft of good universities and research centers, while publishing unreadable newspapers peddling xenophobia and hyper-nationalism. Cairo no longer produces the kind of daring and creative cinema that pioneers like the critically acclaimed director Youssef Chahine made for more than 60 years. Egyptian society today cannot tolerate a literary and intellectual figure like Taha Hussein, who towered over Arab intellectual life from the 1920s until his death in 1973, because of his skepticism about Islam. Egyptian society cannot reconcile itself today to the great diva Asmahan (1917-1944) singing to her lover that “my soul, my heart, and my body are in your hand.” In the Egypt of today, a chanteuse like Asmahan would be hounded and banished from the country.


The jihadists of the Islamic State, in other words, did not emerge from nowhere. They climbed out of a rotting, empty hulk—what was left of a broken-down civilization. They are a gruesome manifestation of a deeper malady afflicting Arab political culture, which was stagnant, repressive and patriarchal after the decades of authoritarian rule that led to the disastrous defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. That defeat sounded the death knell of Arab nationalism and the resurgence of political Islam, which projected itself as the alternative to the more secular ideologies that had dominated the Arab republics since the Second World War. If Arab decline was the problem, then “Islam is the solution,” the Islamists said—and they believed it.

At their core, both political currents—Arab nationalism and Islamism—are driven by atavistic impulses and a regressive outlook on life that is grounded in a mostly mythologized past. Many Islamists, including Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (the wellspring of such groups)—whether they say it explicitly or hint at it—are still on a ceaseless quest to resurrect the old Ottoman Caliphate. Still more radical types—the Salafists—yearn for a return to the puritanical days of Prophet Muhammad and his companions. For most Islamists, democracy means only majoritarian rule, and the rule of sharia law, which codifies gender inequality and discrimination against non-Muslims.

And let’s face the grim truth: There is no evidence whatever that Islam in its various political forms is compatible with modern democracy. From Afghanistan under the Taliban to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and from Iran to Sudan, there is no Islamist entity that can be said to be democratic, just or a practitioner of good governance.

Men det er Raymond Ibrahims fremragende artikel Islams Protestant Reformation fra Juni måned for Frontpage Magazine, som leverer en en dyster forklaring for hele den muslimske verden, nemlig at den er ved at knække over under presset for sin egen kognitive dissonans.

Islam’s scriptures, specifically its “twin pillars,” the Koran (literal words of Allah) and the Hadith (words and deeds of Allah’s prophet, Muhammad), were inaccessible to the overwhelming majority of Muslims.  Only a few scholars, or ulema—literally, “they who know”—were literate in Arabic and/or had possession of Islam’s scriptures.  The average Muslim knew only the basics of Islam, or its “Five Pillars.”

In this context, a “medieval synthesis” flourished throughout the Islamic world.  Guided by an evolving general consensus (or ijma‘), Muslims sought to accommodate reality by, in medieval historian Daniel Pipes’ words,

translat[ing] Islam from a body of abstract, infeasible demands [as stipulated in the Koran and Hadith] into a workable system. In practical terms, it toned down Sharia and made the code of law operational. Sharia could now be sufficiently applied without Muslims being subjected to its more stringent demands…  [However,] While the medieval synthesis worked over the centuries, it never overcame a fundamental weakness: It is not comprehensively rooted in or derived from the foundational, constitutional texts of Islam. Based on compromises and half measures, it always remained vulnerable to challenge by purists (emphasis added).

This vulnerability has now reached breaking point: millions of more Korans published in Arabic and other languages are in circulation today compared to just a century ago; millions of more Muslims are now literate enough to read and understand the Koran compared to their medieval forbears.  The Hadith, which contains some of the most intolerant teachings and violent deeds attributed to Islam’s prophet, is now collated and accessible, in part thanks to the efforts of Western scholars, the Orientalists.  Most recently, there is the Internet—where all these scriptures are now available in dozens of languages and to anyone with a laptop or iphone.

In this backdrop, what has been called at different times, places, and contexts “Islamic fundamentalism,” “radical Islam,” “Islamism,” and “Salafism” flourished.  Many of today’s Muslim believers, much better acquainted than their ancestors with the often black and white words of their scriptures, are protesting against earlier traditions, are protesting against the “medieval synthesis,” in favor of scriptural literalism—just like their Christian Protestant counterparts once did.

Thus, if Martin Luther (d. 1546) rejected the extra-scriptural accretions of the Church and “reformed” Christianity by aligning it more closely with scripture, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (d. 1787), one of Islam’s first modern reformers, “called for a return to the pure, authentic Islam of the Prophet, and the rejection of the accretions that had corrupted it and distorted it,” in the words of Bernard Lewis (The Middle East, p. 333).

The unadulterated words of God—or Allah—are all that matter for the reformists.

Note: Because they are better acquainted with Islam’s scriptures, other Muslims, of course, are apostatizing—whether by converting to other religions, most notably Christianity, or whether by abandoning religion altogether, even if only in their hearts (for fear of the apostasy penalty).

Jalving skrev under blandt andet denne inspiration den glimrende advarsel til Vesten at nissen flytter med i Efter Os Syndfloden.

Men nu ser vi den. Vi ser, at det hele er noget lort på de kanter. Og vi ser noget andet og endnu værre – for os: At vi ikke evner at forvare os mod opløsningen af den arabiske civilisation. Deres ødelæggelse kan blive vores ødelæggelse. Vi importerer den nemlig.

Her tænker jeg ikke kun på de varme lande som arnested for radikalisme og jihad. Det er næsten for banalt, her er dagens episode. Næ, jeg tænker naturligvis også på den voksende strøm af flygtninge og asylansøgere, der vandrer mod Europa – og for de flestes vedkommende – kommer frem og opnår en eller anden ret til at være her – på de europæiske skatteyderes regning.


Hvem skal redde araberne fra sig selv?

Hvorfor peger flaskehalsen på os? Hvorfor er det ikke kinesernes opgave, de er trods alt de kommende, globale magthavere? Hvorfor kigger ingen på Latinamerikas ansvar, de vil for helvede også gerne handle med araberne? Hvorfor kan Putin køre friløb? Og mere graverende: Hvorfor er det ikke araberne, der løser arabernes selvskabte problemer?

Du ved godt hvorfor. Det er kun i Vesten, at vi har fået den tro, at vi og ingen andre kan løse alverdens problemer lige fra nødhjælp til geopolitik. Det er os, dvs. vores nedarvede humanisme, der i generationer har ledt Vesten på vildspor og skabt en grænseløs, universel samvittighed hinsides alle sociale konsekvenser i hjemlandene og gjort menneskerettighedskonventioner til guddommelige anvisninger.

Dér ligger hunden begravet, og det er på tide at sige det ligeud, som det er: Det er os selv, ikke araberne, der har gjort den kroniske arabiske borgerkrig til USA’s, Storbritanniens, Australiens, Canadas, Hollands, Sveriges og Danmarks evige problem. Vi vil og skal hjælpe, koste hvad det koste vil, herunder vores egen deroute.

Deroute er egentlig for venligt et udtryk. Det er ikke alene den arabiske civilisation, der forsvinder for øjnene af os, men tillige vores egen kultur, der synker sammen i bestræbelsen på at spille Jesus, imens vi tillader, at arabere, der tydeligvis ikke vil Danmark eller det land, der har givet dem eller deres forældre en ny chance, huserer som grever og baroner på gader og stræder og opfører sig, som var de herrer i vores hus.

Mærk dig disse dage, det er dage, der forandrer verden, herunder din egen. Tiderne skifter, jeg siger det bare.

Ingen milde sæder kommer af disse tiders skiften dog.

Livet i Kalifatet

En kort rapportage om dagligdagen i Kalifatet.

Islamisk 30-års-krig eller 30 års islamisk krig?

Den arabisk muslimske verden ser ud til at bryde sammen i disse år. Ægyptens General El-Sissi er sikkert ganske sober når han påstår at han ved sit kup forhindrede Ægypten i at henfalde i en borgerkrig som den i Syrien-Irak. Men, hvis vi fokuserer på Syrien-Irak, hvad kan vi så alt andet lige se frem til? Richard Haas skrev i forrige måned i Project Syndicate at han kunne se en arabisk genopførsel af den europæiske Trediveårskrig

It is a region wracked by religious struggle between competing traditions of the faith. But the conflict is also between militants and moderates, fueled by neighboring rulers seeking to defend their interests and increase their influence. Conflicts take place within and between states; civil wars and proxy wars become impossible to distinguish. Governments often forfeit control to smaller groups – militias and the like – operating within and across borders. The loss of life is devastating, and millions are rendered homeless.

That could be a description of today’s Middle East. In fact, it describes Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century.

In the Middle East in 2011, change came after a humiliated Tunisian fruit vendor set himself alight in protest; in a matter of weeks, the region was aflame. In seventeenth-century Europe, a local religious uprising by Bohemian Protestants against the Catholic Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand II triggered that era’s conflagration.

Protestants and Catholics alike turned for support to their co-religionists within the territories that would one day become Germany. Many of the era’s major powers, including Spain, France, Sweden, and Austria, were drawn in. The result was the Thirty Years’ War, the most violent and destructive episode in European history until the two world wars of the twentieth century.

There are obvious differences between the events of 1618-1648 in Europe and those of 2011-2014 in the Middle East. But the similarities are many – and sobering. Three and a half years after the dawn of the “Arab Spring,” there is a real possibility that we are witnessing the early phase of a prolonged, costly, and deadly struggle; as bad as things are, they could well become worse.

Analogien til Trediveårskrigen rummer en falsk præmis om en lighed mellem kristendommen og islam. Trediveårskrigen afgjorde et konkret forhold mellem protestantismen og katolicismen, der erkendte at der eksisterede liv udenfor Kirken. Og den etablerede staterne og sikrede religionsfriheden i en orden, der alt i alt holdt til Napoleonskrigene, hvor en ny moderne virkelighed opstod med nye konflikter. Og selvfølgelig nye krige. Krigen mellem sunnier og shiaer er ikke ny og hadet mellem de to samt til alt andet er en indgroet del af religionernes essens og selvforståelse. Og mere klart bliver det ikke når Haas fortsætter

Islam never experienced something akin to the Reformation in Europe; the lines between the sacred and the secular are unclear and contested.

Moreover, national identities often compete with – and are increasingly overwhelmed by – those stemming from religion, sect, and tribe.

Den fremvoksende islamisme er reformationen, det er det muslimske råb ‘ad fontes’, det er bevidstgjorte muslimers opgør med ulemaens traditionelle fortolkningsret; sole scriptura. Islam kræver verdensherredømme og kan ikke finde hvile blot ved tanken om at der eksisterer dissidenter et sted i verden. Hvis denne krig varer tredive år vil den ikke slutte med en westfalsk fred, men blot med udmattelse indtil næste omgang. Det er også David P Goldmans anke mod Haas, som han skriver i Middle East Forum. For Goldman er krigen i Mellemøsten et demografisk fænomen mere end et strategisk og eksemplerne er trediveårskrigeNE

Wars of this sort end when two generations of fighters are killed. They last for decades (as did the Peloponnesian War, the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars of the 20th century) because one kills off the fathers in the first half of the war, and the sons in the second.

This new Thirty Years War has its origins in a demographic peak and an economic trough. There are nearly 30 million young men aged 15 to 24 in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran, a bulge generation produced by pre-modern fertility rates that prevailed a generation ago. But the region’s economies cannot support them. Syria does not have enough water to support an agricultural population, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of farmers into tent cities preceded its civil war. The West mistook the death spasms of a civilization for an “Arab Spring,” and its blunders channeled the youth bulge into a regional war.

The way to win such a war is by attrition, that is, by feeding into the meat-grinder a quarter to a third of the enemy’s available manpower. Once a sufficient number of those who wish to fight to the death have had the opportunity to do so, the war stops because there are insufficient recruits to fill the ranks. That is how Generals Grant and Sherman fought the American Civil War, and that is the indicated strategy in the Middle East today.

It is a horrible business.


Three million men will have to die before the butchery comes to an end. That is roughly the number of men who have nothing to go back to, and will fight to the death rather than surrender.

Goldman fortsætter med kontrafaktiske analyser man kan nørde lidt med, hvis man er til den slags. Læsværdig er den i hvert fald.

Flames of War - Kalifatets krigserklæring til korsfarerne

Man kan lære meget om islam ved at høre muslimer selv fortælle. Husk at dette er en propagandavideo og sigter altså mod at ægge det muslimske sind. Derved er det også en god kilde til at forstå det muslimske sind. For eksempel vises dette billede fra Syriens parlament, hvor alle kvinderne har slørede ansigter


Men: “WARNING: Insufferable chants during the whole video. Could cause brain cancer or worst!!!” skriver oploaderen venligt og den advarsel er hermed givet videre.

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